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Abstract—The introduction of virtualization techniques in
radio cellular networks allows the emergence of a business based
on the outsourcing of towers hosting antennas and operated
by the so-called Tower Companies (TowerCos). In this paper,
we develop a baseline business model for studying the potential
relationships between network operators and TowerCos. It turns
out that the gain in operational costs achieved when network
operators outsource the management of towers can be gracefully
utilized to reduce prices so as to attract more customers. The
price drop has however to be carefully realized so as not to break
the market share between operators and to preserve competition.
To prove this claim, we adopt in a first step a centralized
optimization formulation. In a second step, we develop a game
theoretic framework.
Keywords-Virtualization, Mobile networks, TowerCos, Business
model, Optimization, Game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of virtualization techniques and soft-
ware defined networking, telecommunication networks are
experiencing a major evolution of their architectures [1] and
business models [2]. Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
[3] notably enables the decoupling between network functions
and their hosting hardware; so far monolithic network func-
tions can then be split [4] and independently instantiated in
data centers.
This major evolution applies to all network segments but the
modifications introduced in Radio Access Network (RAN) [5]
open the door to a complete redesign of cellular networks,
for instance via the development of Cloud RAN [6], [7],
where RAN functions can be split in remote, distributed
and centralized units [8]. If antennas are installed on towers
equipped with a minimal amount of computing and storage
resources, it becomes possible for an operator to deploy remote
units on such a tower by instantiating the required software
while using the resources of the tower. Operators can then
envisage to outsource their towers and thus reduce their OPEX
and CAPEX [9], [10].
This evolution perfectly fits the mobile sharing princi-
ples [11], [12] and notably the emerging market of Tower
Companies (TowerCos) [13]. So far, network operators have
been used to massively invest in their infrastructures, which
cost several tens of billions US dollars (USD), not only for
building towers but also to connect them to the network
(e.g., civil engineering, microwave or optical backhauling,
etc.). Towers actually represent a compulsory charge in mobile
networks, since they are mandatory to reach mobile end
users with the best possible quality of service, implying the
deployment of more and more radio cells. In addition, the
ever-growing demand for bandwidth and coverage as well as
the proliferation of new network services [14] involved in
smart cities, e-health, IoT, etc, require continual infrastructure
upgrade and investments in new mobile generations.
In this context, the emergence of TowerCos introduces
a new way of operating mobile networks, where network
operators invest in softwarized network functions for RAN,
core, and routing networks, while TowerCos invest in in-
frastructures. The global telecom tower market is rapidly
accelerating with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
of almost 17% (in the forecast period), which will represent
an incremental growth of USD 43.71 billion in five years [13].
Currently, the main component in the value chain of a
network operator is the customer basis and not the infras-
tructure; except for the B2B sector, the weight of services
directly offered by a network operator to end users (B2C)
beyond connectivity is marginal in the global balance. Roughly
speaking, while the value of a telecom infrastructure is a few
billions of USD, the valorization of the customer basis, on the
contrary, can be as big as several hundreds of billions USD
because it opens the door to reach thousands of customers
for offering added value services, mainly in an Over The Top
(OTT) mode.
The business of TowerCos is precisely at the confluence
of CAPEX investment by network operators and customer
basis valorization by service providers. On the one hand, the
outsourcing of towers allows network operators to reduce their
operational costs. On the other hand, the creation of a tower
business enables a rapid proliferation of towers and thus allows
more customers to be reached by service providers. It is worth
noting that this is also in line with the MAGMA initiative by
FaceBook [15], which proposes to be the intermediary between
potential customers of a given area and network operators, who
have no sufficient incentive to deploy a cellular infrastructure.
The emergence of TowerCos in the telecommunications
market requires to find a business equation along with an
equilibrium between actors with different objectives:
• The TowerCo valorizes the number of customers, who can
be covered by antennas installed on towers; this number
has to be weighted by the radio quality; the achieved
Quality of Service is an important factor to be taken into
account in the business relationships.
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• The network operator reduces CAPEX by outsourcing
towers but increases OPEX by renting towers; the key
issue for a network operator is to keep or even increase
its customer basis, which is the main valorization asset.
• The objective of Service providers is to reach the largest
number of end users with the best quality (for optimal
Quality of Experience, QoE); the impact factor for the
Service Provider in the value chain is the QoE.
To better understand the possible relationships between
network operators and TowerCos, we develop in this paper
a baseline business model. We consider a market with J0
operators sharing a set of customers. By introducing a utility
function of customers, we determine the market share between
operators and notably their prices and their revenues. We then
investigate what happens when operators outsource the oper-
ation of towers and use this cost reduction to decrease prices.
We first formulate the problem as a centralized optimization
problem, which cannot reflect the reality but helps understand
the impact on the market share. We adopt in a second step a
game theoretic formulation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the system under consideration and we introduce optimality
criteria. We then evaluate in Section III the creation of value
via the outsourcing of towers. We examine the impact on the
market share when operators behave selfishly in Section IV
and cooperatively in Section V. We formulate a game theo-
retic framework in Section VI. Conclusions are presented in
Section VII.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Modeling the market share between operators
We develop in this section a baseline model to illustrate the
role of TowerCos in the context of mobile networks. Note that
we use TowerCo as a generic term to designate a variety of
companies that operate towers. We first consider an area with
a tower, which is capable of covering N end users. A network
operator j can install antennas to reach those customers; we
assume that a single operator can reach up to N users (this
amounts to assuming that there is a strict equivalence between
the deployment of a tower by an Operator or by a TowerCo).
We further assume that J0 operators can share the same tower.
In a multi-operator context, customers covered by the tower
have the choice between K types of contracts that are de-
scribed by a quality level q = 1, . . .K ordered in increasing
order of quality. The quality level chosen by customer i is
denoted by qi. This quality level can for instance correspond
to the amount of data that the customer can use per month
in addition to the basic voice communications. The price paid
by a customer of operator j for quality level q is denoted by
pij(q).
The choice of an operator for a given quality level depends
on the price but also on other factors, such as national
coverage, after-sale or supporting services, the quality of
the hot line, etc. To reflect this situation, we introduce the
utility function u(q, j) for quality level q by operator j. The
utility value increases with the reputation or overall quality of
operator j and decreases with respect to the price (depending
on the quality level).
In the following, we consider utility functions of the form
u(q, j) = αkj − (1− α)pij(q)/pi0
where pi0 is a normalizing price constant and α is some
positive dimensionless constant (related to user behavior and
independent of the operator); this latter constant reflects the
weight of the overall reputation factor kj of operator j in
the decision by a customer to subscribe a contract with this
operator. The quantity (1−α) is the weight of the price pij(q)
in this choice. We further assume that kj = a
j
0 for some pop-
ularity index a0 > 1; this gives an exponential discrimination
between operators, which are labeled in increased order of
reputation. We thus have
u(q, j) = αaj0 − (1− α)pij(qi)/pi0.
With regard to prices, we further assume that they exponen-
tially grow with the quality. This leads us to introduce a price
exponent bj > 1 for operator j. In addition, an operator can
be either low cost with limited offline services or else smart
by offering rich services (hot line, support in shops, etc.). We
assume that price exponents are ordered in increasing order of
the index j; operator j is more competitive in terms of prices
than operator j′ if j < j′ (since bj < bj′ ).
With the above assumptions, the price for quality level q by
operator j is defined as
pij(q) = b
q
jpi0
for some constant price exponent bj > 1 depending on
operator j and the scaling factor pi0 (e.g., pi0 equal to 20 e).
Before proceeding to the analysis of the economic equi-
librium, let us note that the system is characterized by the
following data:
1) the fraction fq of users choosing quality level q =
1, . . . ,K;
2) popularity index a0 of operators;
3) the parameter α weighting the price and the popularity
of operators in the utility function of users;
4) the price exponents bj of operators j = 1, . . . , J0.
This baseline model assumes that depending on the price
exponents bj , j = 1, . . . , J0, all customers choosing the quality
level q will subscribe a contract with the operator maximizing
the utility functions u(i, j) for j = 1, . . . , J0 and q(i) = q.
We consider the revenue of operator j normalized by the
constant pi0 and by the number of users N . This quantity is
defined as
Rj =
K∑
q=1
J0∏
k=1,k 6=j
1{u(q, j) > u(q, k)}fqpij(q), (1)
where 1A = 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise.
The fraction of users choosing operator j is given by
νj =
K∑
q=1
fq
J0∏
k=1,k 6=j
1{u(q, j) > u(q, k)}.
The Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) for operator j is
rj =
Rj
νj
.
B. Optimality criterion
To fix prices, network operators have to adopt a strategy
to share the market. In general the smart operator J0 is the
incumbent operator (e.g., the historical operator in countries
where the telecom market has become competitive). In ad-
dition to make communication services affordable to users,
the regulator puts upper bounds on prices. In this paper, we
assume that the regulator sets an upper bound B for the price
exponents bj , j = 1, . . . , J0. It is also worth noting that if
each operator fixes its own price exponent without taking care
of the others, then it is clear that the operator with the best
reputation will attract all users.
To illustrate this phenomenon, we consider several criteria.
Let us denote by Rj(b) the revenue of operator j when the
prices are b = (bj , j = 1, . . . , J0). If we consider the global
revenue of the system, equal to the sum of the revenues of the
operators, we may consider the optimization problem
max
b∈(1,B]J0
J0∑
j=1
Rj(b) (2)
Each operator will then try to individually optimize its own
revenue by setting bj = B, but the one with the best reputation
will attract all customers.
Now, if instead of the global revenue, we consider the
criterion (known as Nash bargaining)
max
b:1<bk<bJ0<B,k=1,...,J0−1
J0∏
j=1
Rj(b) (3)
then numerical experiments show that customers are better
distributed among operators but the situation is still unfair.
For instance, for J0 = 3, K = 4, fq = 1/4, a0 = 2 and
B = 1.5, the normalized revenues are equal to
R1 = 0.0, R2 = 0.768208, R3 = 1.60797. (4)
We see that the operator with the worst reputation attracts no
customers. This leads us to change the optimality criterion in
order to achieve a fairer market share.
We still consider the product of revenues but introduce the
constraint 1 < b1 < b2 < . . . < bJ0 < B so that operators fix
their prices in function of their reputation. We thus consider
the following optimization problem
max
1<b1<b2<...<bJ0<B
J0∏
j=1
Rj(b), (5)
where Rj is given by Equation (1) and where the price
exponents are ordered according to the reputation of the
operators.
It is worth noting that the above optimization problem may
still have degenerate solutions (in the sense that product is null
at the optimal point b∗). This may occur when the coefficient
a0 is too small. In that case, the two cheapest operators
attract all the users. The most expensive operator can attract
customers only if its reputation factor is sufficiently high and
the prices are not the only discriminating factors. The upper
bound B has hence to be carefully set in function of the
reputation coefficient a0.
As an illustration, we consider the case of K = 4 quality
levels and J0 = 3 operators. There are thus a low cost operator,
a smart and a medium one. The smart operator is in general the
incumbent operator. Incumbent operators have in general good
reputation and offer services with prices higher that the new
entrants. In the numerical experiments, the weighting factor
between prices and reputation is set equal to α = .2. We
further assume that customers are evenly distributed on the 4
quality levels (fq = 1/4 for q = 1, . . . , 4). We take a0 = 2,
B = 1.5 and we solve the optimization problem (5).
The normalized prices (i.e., by dropping the scaling factor
pi0) are displayed in Figure 1. By solving the optimization
problem (5) with
J0 = 3, K = 4, fq = 1/4, a0 = 2, B = 1.5, (6)
we find
b1 = 1.16635, b2 = 1.23821, b3 = 1.5 (7)
The normalized revenues are equal to
R1 = 0.462657, R2 = 0.4746, R3 = 0.9375. (8)
Fig. 1: Normalized prices of the various operators.
Given the prices bj , j = 1, . . . , J0, the utility function of
the users for the various operators in function of the various
quality levels are represented in Figure 2. We observe that
the smart operator will have users with the lowest quality
levels (i.e., customers with moderated communication needs),
which are ready to pay more for hot line and other offline
services. The low cost operator attracts the users with the
best quality because of low prices for a good quality (heavy
users and rather geeks). The medium operator is in between
(in general for small enterprise customers). Even if the model
is oversimplified, it roughly reflects to some extent what can
be observed in European markets.
Fig. 2: Utility functions of users for the various operators.
With this configuration, we see that the fractions νj , j =
1, . . . , 4 (i.e., the fraction of users subscribing a contract with
operator j) are equal to
ν1 = ν2 =
1
4
and ν3 =
1
2
.
The half of the users have a contract with the smart operator
and a quarter with the two other operators. The ARPUs are
given by
ρ1 = 1.85063, ρ2 = 1.8984, and ρ3 = 1.875,
and are very close to each other.
We start from this equilibrium and we analyze in the
next section what happens when the operation of towers is
outsourced. We assume that this outsourcing is massive so
that the revenue of operators is slightly increased by reducing
the amount of OPEX and CAPEX related to the operation of
towers. Globally, we assume that the revenues can be increased
by a small percentage. The goal of the next section is to
understand what will be the impact of this marginal increase
in the revenues on the market share among the three operators.
III. VALUE CREATION VIA MUTUALIZATION
We assume in this section that operators massively out-
source the operation of towers to TowerCo. This leads to a
reduction of CAPEX and OPEX that we can pass on prices.
We investigate in this section how operators can take benefit
of this cost drop to lower prices for possibly attracting more
customers.
We make the following assumptions. Let us suppose that
the cost per month of the tower exploited by an operator is
C (including the OPEX cost and the CAPEX depreciation).
For the sake of simplification, we assume that this cost is the
same for all operators. If the J0 operators exploit their own
towers, then the global exploitation cost is J0C. Let c denote
the normalized price corresponding to C (i.e., C divided by the
number of users N and the scaling factor pi0). If this cost c is
now transferred to the TowerCo, the global normalized revenue
Rj of operator j is increased by c, that is, for j = 1, . . . , J0
Rj = Rj + c− pj ,
where Rj is defined by Equation (1) and pj is the normalized
price paid by operator j to the TowerCo for using the tower.
The normalized revenue of the TowerCo is moreover given by
R0 =
J0∑
j=1
pj − c′,
where c′ is the normalized exploitation cost of the tower
(OPEX and CAPEX depreciation) by the Towerco. The system
is profitable for the TowerCo only if R0 > 0.
Before outsourcing the exploitation of the tower, the global
value of the system was
∑J0
j=1Rj . After outsourcing, the
global value is
J0∑
j=1
R(j) + J0c− c′.
There is thus a value creation equal to J0c − c′, which is
due to the sharing of the tower among operators. By simply
mutualizing the infrastructure, there is thus an operational gain
and then a value creation. Note that we have neglected the cost
of installing the antennas or other radio elements on the tower.
These additional cost may be neglected when considering the
installation and the operation of a tower.
To simplify the discussion, we assume in a first step that
pj is the same for all operators, equal to p. Because of
mutualization, the price p should be less than the operational
cost c, say p = κc, with κ ∈ (0, 1) so that the benefit of
an operator is (1 − κ)c. Let us assume that the operational
cost of the tower is c′ = c (the same as the operational cost
of the tower exploited by a network operator). Under these
assumptions,
R0 = (J0κ− 1)c,
since κ is common to all operators. There is a benefit for the
TowerCo only if κ > 1/J0
Given the potential benefit which can be achieved by
operators via the outsourcing of tower exploitation, we can
envisage various scenarios. In a first one, operators can behave
selfishly. In that case, an operator uses the exploitation gain
to decrease its own price exponent. We investigate in the next
section what happens if only one operator applies this policy. It
turns out that such a selfish behavior can break the equilibrium
between operators. This is why we further study the case when
all operators apply this policy but in coordination. It turns out
that it is possible to translate the exploitation gain into price
reduction without breaking the equilibrium between operators.
In practice, such a coordinated sharing between operators is
not possible and we finally introduce in the subsequent section
a game theoretic formulation of the problem.
IV. SELFISH BEHAVIOR OF OPERATORS
Thanks to the outsourcing of the exploitation of towers,
operators increase their revenue and can then use this marginal
gain to lower prices to attract more customers and in turn
increase their global revenue. In a first step, we examine a
selfish behavior by operators.
We assume that for operator j, outsourcing the exploitation
of a tower increases its normalized revenue by a factor ε,
which is in general equal to a few percents. This operator can
then lower prices by a factor εj as long as the relative revenue
reduction is smaller than ε.
Moreover, by decreasing prices, the reputation of operator
j may also increase by a factor ηεj for some η ∈ (0, 1). In
summary, outsourcing the operation of a tower introduces a
relative gain ε = (1 − κ)c/Rj for the operator, which is a
small percentage and is used to lower prices by a factor εj .
The coefficient η is quite difficult to capture but is introduced
in the following to reflect the increase in popularity.
With all these assumptions, operator j decreases the price
exponent as (1−εj)bj for εj ∈ (0, 1) and the reputation factor
for this operator becomes (1 + ηεj). The normalized utility
function of customer i with respect to this operator is now
u(i, j) = ((1 + ηεj)a
j − ((1− εj)bj)qi . (9)
As we consider a selfish behavior, the utility functions of other
operators are left unchanged.
The price reduction coefficient εj can be increased until the
relative loss of revenue for operator j exceeds ε. Let Rj(εj)
denote the revenue of operator j for a reduction coefficient
εj . Note that the initial revenue is Rj = Rj(0). The reduction
percentage in the revenue is
Rj −Rj(εj)
Rj
.
Then, the maximal reduction factor ε∗j is defined by
ε∗j = sup
{
εj :
Rj −Rj(εj)
Rj
< ε =
(1− κ)c
Rj
}
.
To illustrate what happens when only operator j lowers
prices, we consider the case when ε = (1−κ)cRj = 5% and
η = 10%. We progressively increases εj up to ε∗j . We start
from the equilibrium presented in the previous section.
Results for j = 1 are presented in Figure 3, i.e., when the
low cost operator is the only one to lower its price exponent b1.
We have represented in this figure the faction νk of customers
subscribing a contract with operator k = 1, 2, 3 and the ratio
rk =
R
(1)
k (εj)
Rk
, where R(1)k (ε1) is the revenue of operator k
when operator 1 lowers its prices. Moreover, in this figure,
the abscissa is equal to 100 ε1 + 1.
We clearly see from this figure that by reducing the price
exponent b1, Operator 1 breaks the equilibrium of the previous
section. Starting from a market share of 25 % of customers,
Operator 1 rapidly eliminates Operator 2 by reaching a market
share equal to 50 %. As a consequence, the corresponding
revenue jumps so that r1 = 173 %. This gain in revenue is
used to further decrease the price exponent and gain customers
to reach up to 75 % of the market share in terms of customers.
Operator 3 keeps 25 % of the market by losing 60 % of
the initial revenue. The ultimate utility functions obtained
for ε1 = ε∗1 = 29% are displayed in Figure 4. The smart
operator keeps only the less expensive contracts (low quality
level requirements).
Fig. 3: Operator 1 lowers price exponent b1.
Fig. 4: Utility functions when ε1 = ε∗1.
The same phenomenon occurs when Operator 2 is the only
one to lower the price exponent b2 as illustrated in Figure 5.
Operator 1 rapidly loses all customers. In the same way,
the number of customers of Operator 3 is rapidly halved.
Operator 2 can lower the price exponent b2 by 33 %.
Fig. 5: Operator 2 lowers price exponent b2.
Now, when we consider the smart operator, who has the
biggest market share and the highest revenue, we see from
Figure 6 that this operator can lower the price exponent b3
up to a factor of 4 % without losing his global revenue (the
cut in revenue is compensated by outsourcing the exploitation
of the tower) and without breaking the equilibrium between
operators.
We conclude from the above analysis that the smart operator
can outsource the exploitation of towers and use these savings
Fig. 6: Operator 3 lowers price exponent b3.
to lower prices without breaking the market equilibrium. In
fact, the loss in revenue by lowering prices is compensated
by the cost reduction due to tower outsourcing. Note this
reduction is allowed only because the TowerCo has a positive
revenue since all other operators outsource the tower exploita-
tion.
It is clear that if an operator breaks the equilibrium, then
the revenue of the TowerCo will decrease and the remaining
operators will have to support additional charges. This phe-
nomenon does not occur when the smart operator is the only
one to lower prices. It is worth noting that lowering prices
can attract more users and then increase the revenue of the
operator. This is however not taken into account in the present
model as this may modify the distribution of the fractions (fq)
and then modify the equilibrium point.
V. COORDINATED PRICE REDUCTION
A. The tower is operated by a TowerCo
While we have seen in the previous section that a single
operator can break the equilibrium of the market share, we
investigate here if it is possible that the various operators
lower their respective price basis in a cooperative way without
breaking the equilibrium. For this purpose, we formulate a
global optimization problem. We suppose that the outsourcing
of the exploitation of the tower represents a small percentage
of the normalized revenue of the smart operator, who has the
largest normalized revenue.
We assume that operator j reduces its price exponent bj by
a factor εj so that the utility function is given by Equation (9).
We set  = (ε1, . . . , εJ0) and we denote by Rj() the
normalized revenue when the operators apply the reduction
factors εj for j = 1, . . . , J0.
We denote by δ the ratio of the gain in exploitation equal
to (1 − κ)c to the normalized revenue of operator J0 given
by Equation (1). We assume that δ is small (say, from 1%
to 10%), which means that the operational cost of the tower
is small when compared to the revenue of operator J0. For
operator j, the revenue Rj() after outsourcing must be such
that
Rj() + δR0 > Rj .
As a matter of fact, the revenue of operator j after outsourcing
and lowering the price basis is Rj() + δR0 and must be
beneficial for the operator so that the above inequality is
satisfied.
To determine the price lowering factors εj , we may consider
a criterion which leads to a minimization of the offset Rj()+
δR0 − Rj while ensuring that this quantity is positive. This
leads us to introduce the quantity
(Rj() + δR0 −Rj)+∞ ={
Rj() + δR0 −Rj if Rj() + δR0 ≥ Rj ,
+∞ if Rj() + δR0 < Rj
We then consider the optimization problem:
min

J0∏
j=1
(Rj() + δR0 −Rj)+∞,
where  = (ε1, . . . , εJ0) ∈ [0, 1]J0 . Let ∗ the value of  at
which the minimum is reached.
By solving this optimization problem with the same data as
in the previous section (see Equation (6)) and with δ = 5%,
we find
∗ = (0.0263438, 0.0164209, 0.031625).
The normalized revenues are then
r(∗) = (0.415797, 0.451602, 0.890625).
When comparing the new revenues with the nominal ones, i.e.,
R()/R = (Rj(
∗)/Rj , j = 1, . . . , J0), we find
R(∗)/R = (0.898716, 0.951542, 0.95)
We see that low cost operator loses 10% of revenue while
the two others about 5%, which is the gain due to tower
operation outsourcing. But now, if we consider the global
revenue Rj(∗) of operator j equal to Rj(∗) + δR3e, where
e is the row vector with all entries equal to 1, we have with
R(∗) = (Rj())
R(∗) = (0.462672, 0.498477, 0.9375)
so that
R(∗)/R = (1.00003, 1.05031, 1.)
We therefore see that there is globally no cut in the global
revenues of operators, and even a slight increase for operator
2, which is of the same order of magnitude as δ.
We have run the same experiment when δ = 1% and δ =
10%, we find
∗ = (0.00510478, 0.00146253, 0.00625461),
R(∗) = (0.453282, 0.472521, 0.92814),
R(∗)/R = (0.979737, 0.995619, 0.990016),
R(∗)/R = (1., 1.01537, 1.00002)
and
∗ = (0.0550374, 0.0365904, 0.063953),
R(∗) = (0.368907, 0.424386, 0.843871),
R(∗)/R = (0.797367, 0.894196, 0.900129),
R(∗)/R = (1., 1.09173, 1.00013)
respectively. We still see that the greatest loss in revenue is
for the low cost operator. This is the price to pay in order to
save the market share equilibrium.
The utility functions are displayed for δ = 5% in Figure 7.
We clearly see from this figure the market share equilibrium is
not broken when the price exponents are cooperatively lowered
by the various operators. We also empirically note that the
price basis reduction is about δ/2. It follows that outsourcing
the operation of the tower has a positive impact on the prices
paid by customers and coordination prevents from breaking
the market share between operators. Moreover, even if their
”operational” revenues decrease, the global revenues are left
unchanged.
Fig. 7: Utility functions of the various operators when δ = 5%.
B. The tower is operated by the smart operator
Let us consider in this section the case when the smart
operator operates the tower for its own usage and the other
operators. We have seen in the previous section that this is the
only possibility for an operator to operate the tower since the
equilibrium is rapidly broken when the low cost or medium
operator slightly change their price exponents. In the case
when δ = 5%, we obtain
∗ = (0.0263522, 0.0195924, 0.031439),
R(∗)/R = (0.898685, 0.942367, 0.950291),
R(∗)/R = (1., 1.04113, 1.050293),
where R(∗) = R(∗) + δR3(1, 1, 2). As a matter of fact, the
smart operator still supports the operation of the tower but gets
2δR3 paid by the other operators.
We see that the revenues of all operators decrease but the
global revenue of the low cost operator is left unchanged and
the revenues of the two others increase by a percentage of the
same order of magnitude as δ.
We have run the same experiments for δ equal to 1% and
10% and obtained
∗ = (0.00510479, 0.00287908, 0.00611374),
R(∗)/R = (0.979737, 0.991388, 0.990241),
R(∗)/R = (1., 1.01114, 1.01024),
and
∗ = (0.0550376, 0.0407541, 0.0618965),
R(∗)/R = (0.797367, 0.882653, 0.9032641),
R(∗)/R = (1., 1.08019, 1.10326),
respectively. We observe the same phenomena as in the case
δ = 5%. The operators do not lose their global revenue and
the medium and smart operator experience a gain of δ%.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the smart
operator can achieve some gain when operating the tower
for its own purpose and for the two other operators. For the
low cost operator, this does not change its global revenue
but the global revenues of the medium and smart operator
are increased by a percentage δ. We thus observe that the
operation of the tower by the smart operator is more favorable
to operators than in the case when the tower is operated by
a TowerCo. The major difference is that the global value of
the market is lower in the former case than in the latter. The
difference in the basic situation considered in this paper is of
the order of δR3, which is used in the former situation by the
smart operator to increase its global revenue while lowering
its price exponent.
VI. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
A. Game formulation
So far, we have considered centralized optimization by
assuming that it is possible to fix the price exponents by
solving a unique optimization problem. In other words, we
assume that there exists an oracle capable of fixing the prices
of all operators. This clearly cannot reflect the reality and we
formulate in this section a distributed optimization problem.
For this purpose, we consider a game composed of the J0
operators and possibly the TowerCo as players.
In a first step, we examine the market share between the
operators only, i.e., the operators are the only players of the
game. We denote by J = {1, . . . , J0} the set of players. Let
Aj be the set of actions that can be taken by player j. In the
present case, the only actions that can be taken by a player is to
fix the price exponent. To formulate the game as a multiplayer
matrix game, we furthermore discretize the set of possible
values. Thus, Aj = {βj,k, k = 1, . . . ,Mj} with
βj,k = 1 + k
B − 1
Mj
, (10)
where Mj is the number of possible values for the price
exponent of operator j and B is the upper bound for price
exponents. In the following, we assume that Mj is the same
and hence also Aj for all players, simply denoted by A.
In usual Nash equilibrium problems, players have mixed
policies. In the present case, this would amount to defining a
set of probability distributions Pj on the set A, namely
Pj = {pj : A→ [0, 1] :
∑
a∈A
pj(a) = 1}
The support of a strategy pj is the subset of A of those
elements with a positive probability (namely, {a ∈ A :
pj(a) > 0}). In that case, the revenue of operator j, defined
by Equation (1) can be extended to account of policies as:
Rj(p) =
∑
b∈AJ0
J0∏
k=1
pk(bk)Rj(b),
where Rj(b) is the revenue of operator j for the price exponent
configuration b = (b1, . . . , bJ0). In this paper, we are only
interested in pure policies, i.e., in policies concentrated on a
single value (pj(bj) = 1 for some bj).
A Nash equilibrium is then a policy p∗ in P = ⊗J0j=1Pj
such that for all j ∈ J and aj ∈ A,
Rj(aj , p
∗
−j) ≤ Rj(p∗j , p∗j ), (11)
where p∗−j is the policy (p
∗
1, . . . , p
∗
j−1, p
∗
j+1, . . . , p
∗
J0
).
The above Nash equilibrium problem can actually be viewed
as a multiplayer matrix game. It suffices to introduce the
(M × . . . ×M)-matrix M with entries for (k1, . . . , kJ0) ∈
{1, . . . ,M}J0 defined by
R1(βk1 , βk2 , . . . , βkJ0 ), . . . , RJ0(βk1 , βk2 , . . . , βkJ0 )
where the coefficients βk are defined by Equation (10), where
the index j is ignored since the βj,k are the same for all
players.
Multiplayer matrix game problems are very difficult to
solve. Some algorithms are presented in [16]. In the present
case, the game is much simpler than those considered in
that reference. We consider only pure policies, which consist
of fixing price exponents, and the utility functions satisfy
some remarkable properties as shown below. In fact, to find
a non trivial solution to the game, we shall have to introduce
additional constraints.
B. Resolution
In light of the results of the previous sections, we simplify
the problem by ordering the players in increasing order of price
exponents (and their reputation). We thus only consider the J0-
tuples (β1, . . . , βJ0) such that 1 < β1 < β2 < . . . < βJ0 ≤ B,
or equivalently with the indices k1 < k2 < . . . < kJ0 .
In the previous section when taking J0 = 3 operators
and by setting M = 20, we first note that for fixed
k1 and k2 in {1, . . . ,M} with k1 < k2, the curve of
R3(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) for k3 = k2+1, . . . ,M is piecewise
increasing and reaches a maximum for some value K3(k1, k2).
With the same values as in the previous sections (see Equa-
tion 6), the quantity R3(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) as a function
of k3 for some fixed values of k1 and k2 is displayed for
illustration in Figure 8.
The same phenomenon can be observed for the quan-
tity R1(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) (resp. R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)))
when k1 (resp. k2) varies for fixed (k2, k3) (resp. (k1, k3)).
We have illustrated this phenomenon in Figure 9 for the
quantity R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) as a function of k2 for
some fixed values of (k1, k3). As exhibited in this fig-
ure, the values of R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) (and in fact also
R1(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3))) are null for a wide range of the
Fig. 8: Values of R3(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) as a function of k3
for different values of (k1, k2).
values of k2 (and k1 for R1(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3))). This
means that when fixing a value for k3, the values of
R1(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) and R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) are of-
ten null when the parameters k1 and k2 vary.
Fig. 9: Values of R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) as a function of k2
for different values of (k1, k3).
If we consider an equilibrium state (k∗1 , k
∗
2 , k
∗
3) satisfying
Equation (11) for j = 3, then k∗3 = K3(k
∗
1 , k
∗
2), where
K3(k
∗
1 , k
∗
2) is the point at which R3(k
∗
1 , k
∗
2 , k3) is maxi-
mum when k3 varies. To find an equilibrium, we have to
consider the 3-tuples (k1, k2,K3(k1, k2)) with k1 < k2.
If we run this algorithm without any further restrictions,
then we experimentally observe that the smart operator can
select a price exponent, which maximizes its revenue but
forces the revenues of the other operators to be null (as
observed above, there is only a restricted set of (k1, k2)
values such that R1(β(k1), β(k2), β(K3(k1, k2))) > 0 and
R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(K3(k1, k2))) > 0) . It follows that without
further regulation, the smart operator can exclude the other
operators from the game.
To remedy this situation, two additional actors can regulate
the game so as to avoid the exclusion of players:
• The regulation authority, which can impose rules to oper-
ators so that competition between operators is preserved
and customers have the choice among a diversity of
contracts at different prices; it is worth noting that the
prices by incumbents are often regulated so as to open
the market.
• The TowerCo, whose revenue is directly proportional
to the number of operators hosted by its towers and
thus could deny the access to one of the operators,
which applies a price policy leading to the exclusion of
some others. The TowerCo then becomes a player of the
game, which can indirectly influence the price policies of
operators.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the TowerCo
charges the operators independently of their revenues. In
practice, we could envisage to modulate the fee paid by an
operator to install antennas on the tower as a function of its
revenue or its customers basis. This policy will be investigated
in further studies.
Now, we consider the case when the TowerCo becomes a
player of the game and imposes to operators the following
constraint: the 3-tuple (k1, k2, k3) is eligible only if
R1(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3))R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3))
R3(β(k1), β(k2), β(k3)) > 0. (12)
In the search for the equilibrium state, we identify the
3-tuples (k1, k2,K3(k1, k2)) such that k1 < k2 and
the above constraint is satisfied and which maximizes
R3(β(k1), β(k2), β(K3(k1,K2(k1))); the maximum value of
this quantity is reached at point k∗3 . This yields a set
L = {(k1, k2, k∗3) :
J0∏
j=1
Rj(β(k1), β(k2), β(k
∗
3)) > 0}.
The next step consists of computing the 3-tuples
(k1, k2, k
∗
3) ∈ L, that maximize R2(β(k1), β(k2), β(k∗3)),
which is reached at point k∗2 . This gives rise another set
L′ = {(k1, k∗2 , k∗3) : (k1, k2, k2) ∈ L}.
The final step is to fix k∗1 realizing the maximum value of
R1(β(k1), β(k
∗
2), β(k
∗
3).
By applying the above algorithm for M = 50, we find k∗1 =
27, k∗2 = 33 and k
∗
3 = 50 with price exponents β(k
∗
1) = 1.26,
β(k∗2) = 1.33, and β(k
∗
3) = 1.5; the revenues are
R∗1 = 0.650362, R
∗
2 = 0.588159, R
∗
3 = 0.9375.
We observe that the revenues resulting from the Nash equilib-
rium are slightly different from those obtained by solving the
optimization problem (5). The revenue of the smart operator
is left unchanged, the revenue of the low cost is larger and
even higher to that of the medium one.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced in this paper a baseline model to
illustrate the market share between operators with various
levels of reputation. We have further considered that the
prices by an operator are geometric in terms of the level of
quality (definition of a price exponent). By defining utility
functions of customers, we have introduced various optimality
criteria to fix prices. By ordering price exponents in terms of
reputation levels, we have been able to define an optimality
criterion, which allows a market share between operators
without excluding any of them. This leads to the definition
of an equilibrium (see Problem (5)).
We have subsequently examined the situation when op-
erators can achieve some gain by delegating the operation
of towers hosting their antennas to a TowerCo (the generic
name of companies owning towers). We have investigated the
impact of this outsourcing procedure on the equilibrium, when
operators behave selfishly or cooperatively. It turns out that
a selfish behavior can rapidly break the equilibrium of the
market share. A cooperative behavior can gracefully lower
prices.
We have then formulated a game theory problem to study
the evolution of the market share. It turns out that it is neces-
sary to introduce some rules in order to avoid the exclusion of
a player (i.e., a network operator). Such rules can be imposed
by the regulation authority or the TowerCo, whose revenue is
proportional to the number of players.
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